Yacht Security -
Considerations and steps to take
Press article: 29th June 2005, The Captains' Forum
A YACHT, no matter how large, is not an island. It is not a GRP or aluminium safety cocoon; it does not guarantee its occupants protection and it does not guard against man-made incidents or natural disasters.
Yachts have always been vulnerable; it’s where a majority of owners go to ‘escape’ and ‘relax’, it’s their ‘island paradise’. You don’t go to paradise to relax and escape from reality and then spend your time worrying about the security of your little island.
Only now, three years after the terrorist attacks on the world trade centres, has the subject of yacht security come to the fore. Governments around the globe have prepared contingency plans for the larger marine vessels; they have plans in place to “bring to a conclusion” a maritime incident involving a ferry, cruise liner or a container ship. In this new era The United Kingdom Special Boat Service has already boarded at least one container ship in the English Channel.
The IMO has started with the mandatory ISPS code, which is universally seen as the tip of the proverbial ‘iceberg’ on merchant maritime security; where and to what degree it concludes is anyone’s guess. If it follows the pattern of homeland security in the US, as it probably will, then a much more rigorous and comprehensive set of guidelines will soon become standard. So where does all this leave the master or captain of the private yacht? Are there any considered decisions to make, precautions to take or systems to put in place?
ALL yachts have the capacity to be used in a manner that could cause difficulties for a family, a port or a country. Today we are accustomed to the subject of terrorism in our everyday lives and whilst this would be the worst-case scenario for a yacht owner/captain to be caught up in, it remains one of the easiest ways to enter a country. It is therefore an option open to the terrorist. The problem that we face in the privateyacht industry is mainly one of attitude and perception; the ‘it won’t happen to me’ philosophy. Acts of terrorism involve not only the final act of murder and destruction, but also the process that the terrorist goes through in order to be in a position to carry out that act. It includes the reconnaissance and feasibility study the terrorist will conduct. Is that stowaway really just a stowaway? Who are the couple I’m carrying on this leg?
When you consider that a device the size of a tumble drier could bankrupt a nation, quite apart from sinking a yacht, can the yacht captain/owner honestly guarantee the integrity of his vessel?
Terrorism is not the only scenario to be considered. In this changing world, sooner or later the population will have to come to terms with the fact that our collective security is entirely dependent on our individual security. The government of the day will never have enough resources to guarantee it for us. We cannot be secure as a group, crew, community or country until we are secure as individuals. This means that wherever we are, whatever we are doing, we have a responsibility to everyone else in order to guarantee our own and therefore our group’s security. This is most apparent when people visit strange and foreign lands, something that yachts do as a matter of course and which is at the very heart of the yachting psyche. It is in these very places that the unprepared become an attractive target for the unscrupulous. A well-prepared individual with a well-prepared yacht is mitigating the risk of becoming a victim.
Following are some security steps that can be taken which are quick and easy to implement and also cost effective:
- It is common knowledge which yachts are available for charter; it is also known where they are berthed. A basic investigation can find out when they are available for charter and therefore not in use. In today’s environment these yachts must be effectively guarded when not in use or made completely unmoveable. It must be assumed that a determined criminal has the minimum knowledge to move his or her intended vessel.
- A very effective deterrent to a boat at anchor would be a small craft with the responsibility of questioning any approaching craft. As we have seen in the international news, a terrorist with a motive only has to move within five metres of a vessel at anchor or alongside to be effective should he want to detonate an explosive. Vigilant crew on deck can also insist on approaching vessels giving a wide berth.
- Underwater lighting is becoming more and more popular as a way of presenting the vessel in its ‘best light’. It also has the added benefit of illuminating the immediate area surrounding the yacht both below and above water. At night this is the yacht’s most insecure area, so this system improves the yacht’s security greatly, allowing crew to concentrate on other duties.
- Security does not stop at the end of the working day; it is a 24-hour responsibility. The steps outlined in 1& 2 need to be considered throughout the hours of darkness. Also, it takes less than a minute to gain unauthorised entry onto a yacht, even less if the criminal doesn’t mind being seen.
One thing is certain, with the increase of piracy and apparent unwillingness of some states, something needs to be done. It is becoming increasingly expense prohibitive to insure yachts to travel through certain parts of the world and indeed it is now often impossible. A demonstrably robust security solution can mitigate this cost. When the decision has been made to take on extra security or improve already adopted routines, in which direction does the captain turn to? There are a variety of companies that offer security services. As with any new area in life, choosing an unknown from a pile of unknowns is a difficult task. What should you look out for? It goes without saying that a maritime background is essential; also a strong organisational background is very desirable. When you consider that security affects the entire vessel and that a large superyacht is a complex series of systems, the task of creating an all-encompassing security solution becomes daunting. It is no wonder then that many yachts and companies are turning to recently retired members of the military’s elite maritime Special Forces unit, the SBS. After all, they have unlimited experience in gaining access to vessels around the world in a frequently non-permissive environment.
Superyacht owners and captains, now more than ever, have to treat the security of their vessels both at anchor and alongside with the utmost importance. The days of yachts of value being left alone at anchor has surely passed. Commercially and privately, nobody can afford to ignore the extra need for security. As with the land-based world, the maritime world needs to adjust its practices and methods to stay one step ahead of the criminal mind. With the unrelenting rise in international terrorism, we are all now in the security business.
Simon Rowland
Veritas International
